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Abstract
Scholars studying interactions among multiple communities have often
used the term legal pluralism to describe the inevitable intermingling of
normative systems that results from these interactions. In recent years,
a new application of pluralist insights has emerged in the international
and transnational realm. This review aims to survey and help define
this emerging field of global legal pluralism. I begin by briefly describ-
ing sites for pluralism research, both old and new. Then I discuss how
pluralism has come to be seen as an attractive analytical framework for
those interested in studying law on the world stage. Finally, I identify
advantages of a pluralist approach and respond to criticisms, and I sug-
gest ways in which pluralism can help both in reframing old conceptual
debates and in generating useful normative insights for designing pro-
cedural mechanisms, institutions, and discursive practices for managing
hybrid legal/cultural spaces.
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INTRODUCTION
We live in a world of multiple, overlap-
ping normative communities. Some of those
communities—such as federal, state, and mu-
nicipal governments—are formal legal entities
often wielding coercive force in the service
of a bureaucratically administered set of legal
norms. Others, however, are nonstate commu-
nities created through religious, tribal, ethnic,
or other affiliations. Scholars studying interac-
tions among these multiple communities have
often used the term legal pluralism to describe
the inevitable intermingling of these normative
systems.1
The study of plural normative systems has
arisen from a variety of different scholarly tradi-
tions. Perhaps the earliest analyses of the clashes
between state andnonstate authoritywere those
penned by lawyers, philosophers, and theolo-
gians interested in the respective realms of
church and state authority (see, e.g., Figgis
1913). Likewise, historians studying the regu-
latory role of nonstate entities such as jockey
clubs and stock exchanges noted that these en-
tities often wield more power than does formal
state law (see, e.g., Maitland 1936). Anthropol-
ogists used the idea of legal pluralism to concep-
tualize the relationshipbetween colonial and in-
digenous legal systems (see, e.g., Pospisil 1981).
And social norms theorists (see, e.g., Ellickson
1991) and scholars in behavioral law and eco-
nomics (see, e.g., Jolls et al. 1998) have become
interested in varieties of informal law that of-
ten regulate behavior as much as or more than
official governmental pronouncements.
In recent years, a new application of pluralist
insights has emerged in the international and
transnational realm. This new legal pluralism
1The history of legal pluralism is a matter of some de-
bate. Some associate the term with legal anthropology (see,
e.g., Tamanaha 1993, Merry 1988), whereas others (see,
e.g., F. Benda-Beckmann 1997) trace the use of the term
to lawyers (Hooker 1975). Still others see legal plural-
ism as deriving from church/state conflicts-of-law analy-
sis (see, e.g., Galanter 1981, p. 28). For discussions of the
history of legal pluralism, see Griffiths 1986; Merry 1988;
Vanderlinden 1989; de Sousa Santos 1987; Benda-Beckmann
1997; Tamanaha 1993, 2008.
research was born in the decades following the
collapse of the bipolar ColdWar order in 1989.
During this period, it became clear that a single-
minded focus on state-to-state relations or uni-
versal overarching norms was inadequate to
describe the reality of the emerging global legal
system, with its web of jurisdictional assertions
by state, international, and nonstate norma-
tive communities (e.g., Teubner 1997). As one
commenter puts it:
The nation-state and the interstate system are
the central political forms of the capitalist
world system, and they will probably remain
so for the foreseeable future. What has hap-
pened, however, is that they have become an
inherently contested terrain, and this is the
central new fact on which the analysis must
focus: the state and the interstate system as
complex social fields in which state and non-
state, local and global social relations inter-
act, merge and conflict in dynamic and even
volatile combinations (de Sousa Santos 2002,
p. 94).
Legal pluralism provided a useful alterna-
tive framework because pluralism had always
sought to identify hybrid legal spaces, where
multiple normative systems occupied the same
social field. And although pluralists had often
focused on clashes within one geographical
area—where formal bureaucracies encountered
indigenous ethnic, tribal, institutional, or reli-
gious norms—the pluralist framework proved
highly adaptive to analysis of the hybrid legal
spaces created by a different set of overlapping
jurisdictional assertions (state versus state, state
versus international body, state versus nonstate
entity) in the global arena.2
This review aims to survey and help define
this emerging field of global legal pluralism.
2In that sense, we might more accurately refer to the global
legal system as a multiscalar legal system. For example,
Osofsky (2007) has argued that the termmultiscalar more ac-
curately captures the variety of normative communities with
input at different levels of the legal hierarchy than does the
word global.
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I begin by briefly describing sites for plural-
ism research, both old and new. Then I discuss
how pluralism has come to be seen as an attrac-
tive analytical framework for those interested
in studying law on the world stage. Finally, I
identify advantages of a pluralist approach and
respond to criticisms, and I suggest ways in
which pluralism can help both in reframing old
conceptual debates and in generating useful
normative insights for designing procedural
mechanisms, institutions, and discursive prac-
tices for managing hybrid legal/cultural spaces.
CHANGING SITES
OF LEGAL PLURALISM
As noted above, theorists of pluralism start
from the premise that people belong to (or
feel affiliated with) multiple groups and under-
stand themselves to be bound by the norms
of these multiple groups. Such groups can,
of course, include familiar political affiliations
such as nation-states, counties, towns, and so
on. But many community affiliations, such as
those held by transnational or subnational eth-
nic groups, religious institutions, trade orga-
nizations, unions, Internet chat groups, and a
myriad of other “norm-generating communi-
ties” (Cover 1983, p. 43), may at various times
exert tremendous power over our actions even
though they are not part of an official state-
based system. Indeed, as scholars of legal plu-
ralism have long noted, “not all the phenomena
related to law and not all that are law-like have
their source in the government” (Moore 1986,
p. 15).
Just as importantly, legal pluralists have
studied those situations in which two or more
state and nonstate normative systems occupy
the same social field and must negotiate the
resulting hybrid legal space (see, e.g., Merry
1988, 2007; Moore 1973; Weisbrod 2002;
Engel 1980;Tamanaha 2000; Benda-Beckmann
2002; Benda-Beckmann 2001; Galanter 1981;
Griffiths 1986). Such spaceswere, of course, the
normbefore the rise of themodern state system.
For example, the Roman Empire allowed local
laws to remain in force, and themedieval period
in Europe likewise had at least three systems
of statutory law—Roman law, canon law, and
Germanic Lombard law—alongside statutes
of municipalities and independent states
(Ullmann 1969, p. 71). Combine this with a
robust set of legal regimes that depended on
personal religious, ethnic, or commercial affil-
iation (Morrall 1980), and one has a daunting
web of legal systems. Indeed, seen against this
backdrop, it is clear that legal pluralismwas long
the obvious norm, not something that needed
to be “unearthed” by scholars.
The success of state-building and its
surrounding ideology in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries has undoubtedly
rendered legal pluralism less visible, although
it is perhaps no less vibrant. Thus, Eugen
Ehrlich’s classic depiction of “living law” in
rural Austria documented the ways in which
local customary law continued its influence
(or even dominance) despite sweeping claims
of state authority (Ehrlich 1936). Meanwhile,
canon law and other spiritual codes continued
to exist in uneasy relationship with the state
legal system (Weisbrod 1980, Galanter 1981).
In the twentieth century, anthropologically
oriented legal pluralists focused on the overlap-
ping normative systems created during the pro-
cess of colonization (Merry 1988, pp. 869–72).
Early studies of indigenous law among tribes
and villages in colonized societies noted the
simultaneous existence of both local law and
European law (Malinowski 1926). Indeed,
British colonial law actually incorporated
Hindu, Muslim, and Christian personal law
into its administrative framework (Merry 2007).
This early pluralist scholarship focused on the
hierarchical coexistence of what were imag-
ined to be quite separate legal systems, layered
one on top of the other. Thus, for example,
when Leopold Pospisil (1981) documented the
way in which Kapauku Papuans responded to
the imposition of Dutch law, it was relatively
easy to identify the two distinct legal fields be-
cause Dutch law and Kapauku law were ex-
tremely different. As a result, Pospisil could
readily describe the degree of penetration of
Dutch law, the areas in which the Kapauku had
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appropriated and transformed Dutch law, and
the areas inwhich negotiations between the two
legal systems formed part of a broader political
struggle. Despite the somewhat reductionist
cast of the model, these pioneering studies es-
tablished the key insights of legal pluralism: a
recognition that multiple normative orders ex-
ist and a focus on the dialectical interaction
between and among these normative orders
(Merry 1988, p. 873).
In the 1970s and 1980s, anthropological
scholars of pluralism complicated the picture
in three significant ways. First, they questioned
the hierarchical model of one legal system sim-
ply dominating the other and instead argued
that plural systems are often semiautonomous,
operating within the framework of other legal
fields but not entirely governedby them (Moore
1973, Kidder 1979). As Sally Engle Merry re-
counts, this was an extraordinarily powerful
conceptual move because it placed “at the cen-
ter of investigation the relationship between the
official legal system and other forms of ordering
that connect with but are in some ways separate
fromanddependent on it” (Merry 1988, p. 873).
Second, scholars began to conceptualize the in-
teractionbetween legal systems as bidirectional,
with each influencing (and helping to consti-
tute) the other (Fitzpatrick 1984). This was a
distinct shift from the early studies, which had
tended only to investigate ways in which state
lawpenetrated and changed indigenous systems
and not the other way round. Third, scholars
defined the idea of a legal system sufficiently
broadly to include many types of nonofficial
normative ordering, and they therefore argued
that such legal subgroups operate not only in
colonial societies, but in advanced industrial-
ized settings as well (Merry 1988, pp. 870–71).
Of course, finding nonstate forms of norma-
tive ordering is sometimes more difficult out-
side the colonial context because there is no
obvious indigenous system, and the less formal
ordering structures tend to “blend more read-
ily into the landscape” (Merry 1988, p. 873).
Thus, pluralists argued that, in order to see
nonstate law, scholars would first need to re-
ject what John Griffiths called “the ideology of
legal centralism,” the exclusive positivist focus
on state law and its system of lawyers, courts,
and prisons (Griffiths 1986, p. 2). Instead, plu-
ralists turned to documenting “forms of social
regulation that draw on the symbols of the law,
to a greater or lesser extent, but that operate
in its shadows, its parking lots, and even down
the street in mediation offices” (Merry 1988,
p. 874).
Meanwhile, scholars drawingmore frompo-
litical theory than from anthropology have long
focused on the fact that, prior to the rise of the
state system, much lawmaking took place in au-
tonomous institutions and within smaller units
such as cities and guilds, while large geographic
areas remained largely unregulated [Ehrlich
1936 (1962), von Gierke 1934, von Gierke &
Heiman 1977]. And, like the anthropologists,
these researchers observed a wide range of non-
state lawmaking even in modern nation-states:
in tribal or ethnic enclaves (Weyrauch & Bell
1993), religious organizations (Weisbrod1980),
corporate bylaws, social customs (Fuller 1968),
private regulatory bodies, and various groups,
associations, and nonstate institutions (Laski
1919, Ellickson 1991,Macaulay 1963). As these
studies make clear, “private, closely knit, ho-
mogenous microsocieties can create their own
norms that at times trump state law and at
other times fill lacuna[e] in state regulation,
but nonetheless operate autonomously” (Levit
2005, p. 184).
More recently, a new group of legal plu-
ralists has emerged under the rubric of social
norms theory. Interestingly, however, these
scholars rarely refer to the anthropologists
and political theorists who have long explored
pluralism, perhaps because social norms theory
has emerged as a branch of behavioral law and
economics. The study of social norms, in its
broadest formulation, focuses on the variety of
“rules and standards that define the limits of
acceptable behavior”; such social norms “may
be the product of custom and usage, organiza-
tional affiliations, consensual undertakings and
individual conscience” ( Jones 1994, p. 545). In
addition, “norm entrepreneurs,” defined as in-
dividuals or groups that try to influence popular
228 Berman
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opinion in order to inculcate a social norm,
may consciously try to mobilize social pressure
to sustain or create social norms (Nadelmann
1990, Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). And while
some pluralists think that this broader category
of social norms dilutes legal pluralism’s historic
focus on more stable religious, ethnic, or tribal
groupings (Tamanaha 1993, Dane 1991), social
norms theory has the benefit of including
larger transnational communities that may
be based on long-term rhetorical persuasion
rather than on face-to-face interaction. In-
deed, social norms theory tends to emphasize
the process whereby norms are internalized
through guilt, self-bereavement, a sense of
duty, and a desire for esteem, or simply by
slowly altering categories of thought and the
set of taken-for-granted ideas that constitute
one’s sense of the way things are.3
In part because legal pluralists of all stripes
have seen themselves in opposition to so-called
legal centralists, who focus on formal state law,
there has historically been little space within
the pluralist literature for examining state-to-
state relations. Yet jurisdictional overlap of a
sort that is very familiar to scholars of plural-
ism is now a staple of the global legal arena.
The growth of global communications tech-
nologies, the rise ofmultinational corporate en-
tities with no significant territorial center of
gravity, and the mobility of capital and peo-
ple across borders mean that many jurisdictions
will feel effects of activities around the globe,
which will inevitably lead to multiple assertions
of legal authority over the same act, without re-
gard to territorial location. In addition, nation-
states must also often share legal authority with
one or more international and regional courts,
tribunals, and regulatory entities. Indeed, the
Project on International Courts and Tribunals
(http://www.pict-pcti.org) has identified ap-
proximately 125 international institutions, all
issuing decisions that have some effect on state
3See studies of legal consciousness (e.g., Ewick & Silbey
1998) and of the way in which legal consciousness research
can inform our understanding of how international law can
be effective even without coercive sanctions (Berman 2006).
legal authority, although those effects are some-
times deemed binding, are sometimes consid-
ered merely persuasive, and often fall some-
where between the two. Finally, nonstate legal
(or quasi-legal) norms continue to add to the
pluralism of the global arena. Given increased
migration and global communication, it is not
surprising that people feel ties to, and act based
on affiliations with, multiple communities in
addition to their territorial ones. Such com-
munities may be ethnic, religious, or epistemic,
transnational, subnational, or international, and
the norms asserted by such communities fre-
quently challenge territorially based authority.
These nonstate legal regimes often influence
(or are incorporated into) state or international
regimes (Levit 2005, Weisbrod 1999).
Interestingly, for a long time social scien-
tists paid little attention to these various forms
of global legal pluralism, perhaps for the same
reason as international relations realists: They
did not see international law as “real” law wor-
thy of study.Thus, just as realist scholars treated
international law merely as an epiphenomenon
of political power, social scientists—with some
exceptions, of course—saw no formal mecha-
nisms of coercive enforcement and therefore
tended to train their gaze on domestic impo-
sition of (and resistance to) normative orders.
In addition, some social scientists may have re-
flexively resisted the claims of international law,
viewing such claims as hegemonic impositions
of Western norms onto indigenous communi-
ties. Accordingly, global legal pluralism has at-
tracted legal scholars at least as much as it has
attracted social scientists. It is to this new body
of scholarship that this review now turns.
THE RISE OF GLOBAL
LEGAL PLURALISM
Those who study international public and
private law have not, historically, paid much
attention to legal pluralism [although there
have certainly been exceptions (e.g., Kingsbury
1998)]. This is because the emphasis tradition-
ally has been on state-to-state relations. Indeed,
international law has generally emphasized
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bilateral and multilateral treaties between and
among states, the activities of the United
Nations, the pronouncements of international
tribunals, and (somewhat more controversially)
the norms that states had obeyed long enough
that such norms could be deemed customary.
This was a legal universe with two guiding prin-
ciples. First, law was deemed to reside only
in the acts of official, state-sanctioned entities.
Second, law was seen as an exclusive function
of state sovereignty.4
Both principles, however, have eroded over
time. The rise of a conception of international
human rights in the post–World War II era
transformed individuals into international
law stakeholders possessing their own entitle-
ments against the state. But even apart from
individual empowerment, scholars have more
recently come to recognize the myriad ways
in which the prerogatives of nation-states are
cabined by transnational and international
actors. Whereas F.A. Mann (1984, p. 20) could
confidently state in 1984 that “laws extend so
far as, but no further than the sovereignty of
the State which puts them into force,” many
international law scholars have argued, at least
since the end of the Cold War, that such a nar-
row view of how law operates transnationally is
inadequate. Thus, the past 20 years have seen
4Of course, this is an oversimplified vision of international
law. Nonstate sources—including the idea of natural law
itself—have long played a key role in the development of in-
ternational legal principles. Indeed, prior to Bentham, these
nonstate sources, including the universal common law of jus
gentium, were arguably far more important than the norms
generated by states (Koh 1997, p. 2604). For example, during
theMiddle Ages, treaties—which are usually viewed today as
the positive law of state interaction—were deemed subject to
the overarching jurisdiction of the church because they were
sealed by oaths. Even later, no less a theorist than Vattel,
while repudiating natural law’s religious underpinnings, con-
tinued to ground international law in the laws of nature (de
Vattel 1797). In the nineteenth century, although positivism
reigned both in the United States and abroad, transnational
nonstate actors nevertheless played important roles. Natural
law principles continue to undergird many international law
doctrines, such as jus cogens norms ( Janis 2003). Thus, the
focus onnonstate normgeneration is not a newphenomenon,
but I argue that it is reemerging as a significant branch of
scholarship within international law and that it may even call
for a reclassification of international law itself.
increasing attention to the important—though
sometimes inchoate—processes of interna-
tional norm development (Berman 2005,
pp. 488–89). Such processes inevitably lead
scholars to consider overlapping transnational
jurisdictional assertions by nation-states, as
well as norms articulated by international bod-
ies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
multinational corporations and industry
groups, indigenous communities, transnational
terrorists, networks of activists, and so on.
In this consideration, U.S. scholars of global
legal pluralism have hearkened back to the in-
sights of Robert Cover. Like other legal plural-
ists, Cover refused to privilege the legitimacy
or authority of state lawmaking as compared to
other normative communities. Thus, he argued
that “all collective behavior entailing systematic
understandings of our commitments to future
worlds [can lay] equal claim to the word ‘law’”
(Cover 1992, p. 176). This formulation deliber-
ately denies the nation-state any special status
as a lawgiver. According to Cover, although
the status of such “official” behavior and
“official” norms is not denied the dignity of
“law” . . . it must share the dignity with thou-
sands of other social understandings. In each
case the question of what is law and for whom
is a question of fact about what certain com-
munities believe and with what commitments
to those beliefs (Cover 1992, p. 176).
Of course, Cover was not blind to the fact
that some lawgivers wield the power of coer-
cive violence. Indeed, Cover frequently sought
to make judges more aware of the violence
they do, going so far as to say that judges
are inevitably “people of violence.” Cover ar-
gued that “[b]ecause of the violence they com-
mand, judges characteristically do not create
law, but kill it. Theirs is the jurispathic office”
(Cover 1983, p. 53). In this vision, judges use
the force of the state to crush competing legal
conceptions pushed by alternative normative
communities.
At the same time,Cover’s visionopens up the
possibility of creative alternatives because he
230 Berman
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locatedwithin legal forms a space for resistance,
contestation, and adaptation. For example, in
his one foray into international law, he acknowl-
edged that the Nuremberg War Crimes trials
were a form of victors’ justice (Cover 1992,
pp. 196–97). However, he then argued that,
once the legal form of having trials for crimes
against humanity was created, this form could
be appropriated by other normative communi-
ties and used against the powerful. Thus, he de-
scribed the trial of the VietnamWar organized
by Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre as an
attempt to appropriate the Nuremberg form.
Moreover, Cover acknowledged the impact of
legal enunciations, whether state based or not,
on legal consciousness. He therefore defended
the Nuremberg trials based on “the capacity of
the event to project a new legalmeaning into the
future.” Such legal meaning was then available
for others to use and build upon in subsequent
iterations.
Finally, Cover identified jurisdictional poli-
tics as an important locus for the clashof norma-
tive visions. According toCover, law is “a bridge
in normative space” that “connects the world-
that-is . . .with worlds-that-might-be” (Cover
1992, p. 176). Indeed, he made clear that it is
in the assertion of jurisdiction itself that these
norm-generating communities seize the lan-
guage of law and articulate visions of future
worlds. If jurisdiction is, literally, the ability to
speak as a community, then, he suggested, we
can begin to develop a “natural law of jurisdic-
tion” (Cover 1983, p. 58), in which communi-
ties claim the authority to use the language of
law based on a right or entitlement that is sep-
arate from the particular sovereignties of the
present moment. Such jurisdictional assertions
are significant because, even though they lack
coercive power, they open a space for the ar-
ticulation of legal norms that are often subse-
quently incorporated into official legal regimes.
Indeed, once we recognize that the state does
not hold a monopoly on the articulation and
exercise of legal norms, then we can see law as
a terrain of engagement, where various com-
munities debate different visions of alternative
futures.
The importance of multiple jurisdictional
assertions is a key part of Cover’s (1981) es-
say, “The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy.”
Although this essay was focused on the variety
of official law pronouncers in the U.S. federal
system, Cover celebrated the benefits that ac-
crue from havingmultiple overlapping jurisdic-
tional assertions. Such benefits included greater
possibility for error correction, a more robust
field for norm articulation, and a larger space
for creative innovation. And though Cover ac-
knowledged that it might seem perverse “to
seek out a messy and indeterminate end to con-
flicts which may be tied neatly together by a
single authoritative verdict,” he nevertheless ar-
gued that we should “embrace” a system “that
permits tensions and conflicts of the social or-
der” to be played out in the jurisdictional struc-
ture of the system (1981, p. 682). Thus, Cover’s
pluralism, though here focused on U.S. feder-
alism, can be said to embrace the creative pos-
sibilities inherent in multiple overlapping ju-
risdictions asserted by both state and nonstate
entities in whatever context they arise.
Although Cover, like other legal pluralists,
focused primarily on domestic legal processes,
his insights have proved to be inspirational to
succeeding generations of scholars considering
the role that plural sources of norms can play
in the international and transnational sphere.
For example, in the 1990s Harold Hongju Koh
tackled the perennial question of why states
obey international law even in the absence (usu-
ally) of obviously coercive sanctions. In a se-
ries of influential articles, Koh (1996, 1997,
1998, 1999) identified what he called “transna-
tional legal process,” which emphasizes itera-
tive practices of states that are spurred by norm
entrepreneurs both inside and outside govern-
ments and that become habitual over time. Sig-
nificantly, the major innovation of Koh’s vision
was that it wedded a process-based focus on
norm articulation to a Cover-like embrace of
the potentially jurisgenerative power of inter-
national and transnational legal norms. Cover
had defined jurisgenerative processes as those
in which interpretive “communities do create
law and do give meaning to law through their
www.annualreviews.org • The New Legal Pluralism 231
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narratives and precepts” (Cover 1983, p. 40).
Koh invoked this jurisgenerative role of inter-
national and transnational law in multiple ar-
ticles. Thus, by deploying Cover’s pluralism,
transnational legal process emerged as a way
to explain the impact of international law even
when it was not backed by obvious coercive
power.
Building further on Koh’s approach has re-
quired scholars to delve deeper into legal plu-
ralism and to take its insights even more firmly
to heart. Although Koh’s transnational legal
process framework ushered in an influential
perspective on international law, that frame-
work is now being expanded in significant ways,
reflecting an ever-deepening pluralist orienta-
tion. In the following subsections, I briefly de-
scribe some of the sites of study for a plural-
ist approach. This new scholarship, as I have
argued elsewhere (Berman 2005), begins to
turn the focus of inquiry from international
law—traditionally conceived as state-to-state
interactions—to law and globalization, a more
multivalent study.
The Multidirectional Interaction
of Local, National, and International
Norms
Both international law triumphalists and inter-
national law critics tend to share a top-down vi-
sion of international law. From this perspective,
international norms are imposed on nation-
states or local actors, and the challenge (or the
fear) is the degree to which various popula-
tions imbibe the international norm. Even the
transnational legal process paradigm, although
it acknowledges an important role for nonstate
norm entrepreneurs, tends to focus ultimately
on the ways in which state actors internal-
ize international norms, thereby emphasizing a
top-down model.
This top-down conception, however,
captures only part of the picture of how law
operates globally. After all, nation-state bureau-
cracies may imbibe institutional roles from one
another (Goodman & Jinks 2004). Moreover,
the so-called international community is not
a monolithic entity, but rather a collection of
interests. Similarly, local norms are always con-
tested, even within their communities (Sunder
2003), and local actors may well invoke non-
local norms for strategic or political advantage
(Merry & Stern 2005) or “vernacularize” them
for a local audience (Merry&Goodale 2007). In
addition, local actors deploying or resisting na-
tional or international norms may well subvert
or transform them, and the resulting transfor-
mation is sure to seep back up so that, over
time, the international norm is transformed as
well (Rajagopal 2003, 2005; de Sousa Santos &
Rodriguez Garavito 2005). And on and on.
Thus, the local, the national, and the in-
ternational are all constantly shifting concepts
(Benhabib 2008, p. 74). Accordingly, scholars of
global legal pluralism study the back and forth
of the feedback loops: How do local actors ac-
cess the power ofNGOs?Howdo global scripts
get replayed in local contexts? How are gov-
ernmental and foundation funding decisions
made, and how do funding priorities affect the
projects undertaken around the world? How
are global norms deployed locally? Are local
concerns strategically transformed by elected
elites at the national and international level?
How do UN bureaucracies foster the creation
of a cadre of local actors who are more aligned
with other UN officials than with those in their
home countries?What role doWestern univer-
sities play in the creation of national and local
norms given that many local elites are educated
abroad? Only through a more fine-grained, nu-
anced understanding of the way legal norms
are passed on from one group to the other and
then transformed before spreading back again
can scholars begin to approach themultifaceted
ways in which legal norms develop.
Nonstate International Lawmaking
A more pluralist account of international law
also recognizes the wide variety of nonstate
actors engaged in the establishment of norms
that operate internationally and transnation-
ally. For example, as Levit (2005) has noted in
the context of transnational trade finance, rules
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embodied in various informal standards, pro-
cedures, and agreements that bind banks and
credit agencies have the force of law even with-
out any official governmental involvement. She
also points out that more formal lawmaking
institutions such as the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) have, over time, appropriated
these norms into their official legal instruments.
In some circumstances, official legal actors
may delegate lawmaking authority to nonstate
entities or recognize the efficacy of nonstate
norms. For example, commercial litigation,
particularly in the international arena, increas-
ingly takes place before nonstate arbitral panels
(Dezalay &Garth 1996). Likewise, nongovern-
mental standard-setting bodies, from Under-
writers Laboratories, Inc. (which tests electrical
andother equipment) to theMotionPictureAs-
sociation of America (which rates the content of
films) to the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (which administers the
Internet domain-name system), construct de-
tailed normative systems with the effect of law.
Meanwhile, regulation of much financial mar-
ket activity is left to private authorities such as
stock markets or trade associations like the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers. These
international trade-association groups and their
private standard-setting bodies wield tremen-
dous influence in creating voluntary standards
that become industry norms.
The proliferation of international tribunals
also, of course, creates the opportunity for plu-
ral norm creation. Thus, commentators have
noted the increasing role ofWTOappellate tri-
bunals in creating an international common law
of trade (Bhala 1998/1999), as well as the new
prominence of other specialized trade courts
developed in connection with free trade agree-
ments (Ahdieh 2004). Moreover, although only
state parties can be formal litigants in theWTO
dispute-resolution process, free trade panels
permit private parties to challenge domestic
governmental regulations directly. In addi-
tion, a number of international conventions,
although signed by state parties, empower pri-
vate actors to develop international norms. For
example, the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Na-
tionals ofOther States permits private creditors
to sue debtor states in an international forum.
Similarly, the Convention on the International
Sale of Goods allows transacting parties to
opt out of any nation-state law and instead to
choose a sort of merchant law reminiscent of
the feudal era’s lex mercatoria (Gillette 2004).
Accordingly, amore comprehensive concep-
tion of the global legal order must attend to
the jurisdictional assertions and articulations of
legal (or quasi-legal) norms by nonsovereign
communities. Such jurisdictional assertions are
significant because, although they often lack
state-backed coercive power, they may in fact
carry real coercive force, and evenwhen they do
not have any coercive force at all theymay open
a space for the articulation of legal norms that
are often subsequently incorporated into offi-
cial legal regimes. Thus, as Cover recognized,
law is not simply a mechanism of state control;
it is also a locus for various communities to ad-
vance alternative visions.
Dialectical Legal Interactions
As noted above, some scholars of international
law fail to find real law there because they
are looking for hierarchically based commands
backed by coercive power. In contrast, those
who take a pluralist approach understand that
interactions among various tribunals and reg-
ulatory authorities are more likely to take on a
dialectical quality that is neither the direct hier-
archical review traditionally undertaken by ap-
pellate courts nor simply the dialogue that often
occurs under the doctrine of comity (Ahdieh
2004). In the international context, for exam-
ple, we may see treaty-based courts exert an
important influence even as national courts re-
tain formal independence, much as U.S. fed-
eral courts exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction
maywell influence state court interpretations of
U.S. constitutional norms in criminal cases. In
turn, the decisions of national courts may also
come to influence international tribunals.
This dialectical relationship, if it emerges,
will exist without an official hierarchical
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relationship based on coercive power. For ex-
ample, in 2003 a North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) panel determined that
a particular Mississippi state appellate proce-
dure violated international norms of due pro-
cess and constituted an unfair trade practice.
In futureMississippi cases concerning the same
procedure, the state court will therefore face a
form of choice-of-law decision, with the state
court determining what weight to give the
NAFTA tribunal action. Likewise, within the
European Union, we see a similar dialectical
dance between the European Court of Hu-
man Rights and the various state constitutional
courts (Krisch 2008). And of course court-to-
court dialectical regulation is only the tip of
the iceberg, as transnational and intersystemic
regulation (both within and among states) takes
on a similar dialectical dynamic (Ahdieh 2006,
Burke-White 2004).
Conflicts of Law
More than 15 years ago, German theorist
Gunther Teubner (1993) called for the creation
of an “intersystemic conflicts law” derived not
just from collisions among the nation-states of
public international law, but from what he de-
scribed as “collisions between distinct global
social sectors.” Since then, the web of intersys-
temic lawmaking Teubner described has only
grown more complex. In a world of extrater-
ritorial and nonterritorial effects, local popula-
tions increasingly attempt to assert dominion
(or, in legal terms, jurisdiction) over territori-
ally distant acts or actors. At the same time,
nonlocal actors invoke the jurisdiction of in-
ternational or transnational tribunals in order
to avoid the consequences of local legal pro-
ceedings. In both circumstances, battles over
globalization are often fought on the terrain of
conflict of laws.
For example, online communication creates
the possibility (and perhaps even the likeli-
hood) that content posted online by a person
in one physical location will violate the law in
some other physical location. This poses an
inevitable problem of extraterritoriality. Will
the person who posts the content be required
to conform her activities to the norms of the
most restrictive community of readers? Al-
ternatively, will the restrictive community of
readers, which has adopted a norm regarding
Internet content, be subjected to the proscribed
material regardless of its wishes? The answers
to these questions depend both on whether the
community of readers asserts the jurisdictional
authority to impose its norms on the foreign
content provider and whether the home coun-
try of the content provider chooses to recog-
nize the norms imposed (Berman 2002). Cross-
border environmental (Sands 2001, Osofsky
2007, Osofsky & Levit 2008) and trade regula-
tion (Ahdieh 2004, Trujillo 2007) raises similar
issues.
Just as local communities affected by dis-
tant corporate activity may seek to assert juris-
diction over those allegedly causing the harm,
corporations may seek to avoid local jurisdic-
tion by invoking the competing jurisdiction of
international tribunals. For example, as noted
above, under NAFTA and other similar agree-
ments special panels can pass judgment on the
due process provided in local legal proceed-
ings. Although these panels cannot directly re-
view or overturn local judgments, they can levy
fines against the federal government signato-
ries to the agreement, thereby undermining
the impact of the local judgment. Meanwhile,
in the realm of human rights, criminal defen-
dants convicted in state courts in the United
States have proceeded (through their govern-
ments) to the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) to argue that they were denied the right
to contact their consulate, as required by treaty.
Again, although the ICJ judgments are tech-
nically unenforceable in the United States, at
least one state court followed the ICJ’s com-
mand anyway (Berman 2008). In a similar vein,
the very creation of a commission of inquiry
(Dickinson 2003) or the mere assertion of ju-
risdiction in one place over an alleged human
rights abuser elsewhere (Burke-White 2008)
can spur activity in the abuser’s home commu-
nity, thereby sparking greater possibilities for
enforcement.
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In each of these circumstances, we see a di-
alectical dance arising from the fact that multi-
ple communities are asserting jurisdiction over
the same activities. Such dances are likely to
become the norm as a variety of communities
claim an interest in regulating distant behavior
having extraterritorial effects or as parties claim
a community affiliation beyond the local. Thus,
there is an increasing global instantiation of the
jurisdictional redundancy Cover celebrated in
the domestic realm (Resnik 2006; 2008a,b,c).
All of these extraterritorial jurisdictional as-
sertions inevitably increase the pressure on
choice-of-law doctrines as well. For example,
Chander (2001) has observed that many mem-
bers of the Indian-American diaspora purchase
bonds issued by their home country. The pur-
chase of these bonds obviously reflects the en-
during tie these members of the Indian dias-
pora have to their homeland. Thus, one might
argue that, even when the bonds are purchased
in the United States, the purchases should be
governed by Indian, rather thanU.S., securities
laws because the bond sale reflects a substan-
tive (and voluntary) tie between the purchasers
and the Indian government. Likewise, multina-
tional copyright disputes could be adjudicated
through the application of hybrid legal norms
drawn from a variety of relevant countries
(Dinwoodie 2000).
Meanwhile, a fluidly plural system makes it
more likely that authorities in one territorial
location will be asked to enforce a judgment
issued elsewhere. Or, particularly in multieth-
nic states, there may be a variety of conflict-
ing adjudicatory authorities within the same
state, and the question becomes whether the
different authorities will at least recognize one
another’s judgments, even without recognizing
each other’s legitimacy (Baylis 2007). The cri-
teria for making these sorts of enforcement de-
cisions are uncertain and likely to change over
time. Within the United States, the Constitu-
tion’s Full Faith and Credit Clause (Article IV,
Section 1) requires that a valid judgment is-
sued by one state be enforced by every other
state even if the judgment being enforcedwould
be illegal if issued by the rendering state. Of
course, within a single, relatively homogenous
country, the idea of one state enforcing another
state’s judgment does not seemso significant be-
cause the variations from state to state are likely
to be relativelyminor. In contrast, transnational
recognition of judgments is more controversial.
Yet, although the decision to enforce a
judgment surely is less automatic when the
judgment at issue is rendered by a foreign
(or international) tribunal, many of the same
principles are still relevant. Thus, courts could
acknowledge the importance of participating
in an interlocking legal system, where litigants
cannot simply avoid unpleasant judgments by
relocating. Moreover, deference to other law-
making bodies has long-term reciprocal bene-
fits. Particularlywhen theparties haveno signif-
icant affiliation with the enforcing community,
there is little reason for a court to insist on
following domestic public policies in the face of
such competing conflicts values and therefore
deny enforcement. And although the doctrine
of comity has long been used to capture these
values, thinking of the issue as a matter of judg-
ment recognition (instead of comity) may dis-
courage courts from reflexively invoking public
policy to avoid unpopular foreign judgments.
In any event, it is clear that, in a world of
plural normative assertions, one crucial ques-
tion will be whether a community’s articulation
of norms is sufficiently persuasive to convince
those wielding coercive power to enforce such
norms. For example, if a community purports
to adjudicate a dispute, its judgment is not nec-
essarily self-executing, particularly if the losing
party is territorially distant. Thus, some en-
tity with police power must enforce the judg-
ment. Accordingly, the question becomes not
whether a community can assert jurisdiction,
but whether other communities are willing to
give deference to the judgment rendered and
enforce it as if it were their own. Indeed, as
Cover himself acknowledged (1992, p. 187),
even at the moment that a community daringly
asserts its own legal jurisdiction, it is immedi-
ately forced to acknowledge that its invention
is limited by the willingness of others to accept
the judgment as normatively legitimate. Such
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jurisdictional politics form an inevitable part of
a global system less defined byWestphalian de-
lineations of authority based on clear territorial
boundaries.
The Disaggregation of the State
One of the reasons that it is so important to
conceive of law beyond the state level is that the
state itself is increasingly delegating authority
to private actors who exist in a shadowy world
of quasi-public/quasi-private authority. The is-
sue of private parties exercising forms of gov-
ernmentally authorized power has long been a
subject of U.S. constitutional law jurisprudence
and scholarship, but international law schol-
ars are only just beginning to consider such is-
sues. Thus, for example, Singer (2003) notes
that many military activities—including com-
bat, surveillance, training, and interrogation
functions—are increasingly being contracted
out to private companies. Yet both domestic and
international accountability mechanisms have
historically been premised on such roles be-
ing played by governmental actors. Meanwhile,
the literature on privatization in the domestic
context often focuses on theU.S. constitutional
doctrines of “state action” or nondelegation of
congressional authority to administrative agen-
cies. Neither of these analytical frameworks is
precisely applicable to the international context
(Dickinson 2010). Likewise, studies of transna-
tional regulatory networks, intersystemic reg-
ulation, and the role of NGOs and industry
standards in shaping norms reflect the growing
disaggregation of state-based governance mod-
els. Thus, over the coming decades, a plural-
ist approach to international law will undoubt-
edly explore the many ramifications of this new
trend in governance.
Obviously, this quick survey does not even
begin to describe the range of inquiries opened
up, or illuminated, by a global legal plural-
ist framework. But perhaps most fundamen-
tally, no matter what the particular object of
study may be, a pluralist account encourages a
more microempirical analysis of how transna-
tional, international, and nonstate norms are
articulated, deployed, changed, and resisted in
thousands of different local settings. Such stud-
ies focus on the extent towhich suchnormshave
real impact on the ground. Therefore, a plural-
ist approach provides an important alternative
both to traditional doctrinal international law
and to rational choice and realistmodels of law’s
impact.
ADVANTAGES OF A PLURALIST
APPROACH AND RESPONSES
TO CRITICISMS
As discussed above, legal pluralism can help
international law find a more comprehensive
framework for conceptualizing the clash of
normative communities in the modern world.
Consider, for example, Sally Falk Moore’s idea
of the “semiautonomous social field,” which she
describes as one that
can generate rules and customs and symbols
internally, but that . . . is also vulnerable to
rules and decisions and other forces emanat-
ing from the larger world by which it is sur-
rounded.The semiautonomous social field has
rule-making capacities, and the means to in-
duce or coerce compliance; but it is simulta-
neously set in a larger social matrix which can,
and does, affect and invade it, sometimes at
the invitation of persons inside it, sometimes
at its own instance (Moore 1973, p. 720).
Notice that, following Moore’s idea, we can
conceive of a legal system as both autonomous
and permeable; outside norms affect the system
but do not dominate it fully. The framework
thus captures a dialectical and iterative inter-
play that we see among normative communities
in the international system, an interplay that
rigidly territorialist or positivist visions of legal
authority do not address.
Even more fundamentally, legal pluralists
have observedways in which state law and other
normative orders mutually constitute one an-
other. Thus, for example, the family and its le-
gal order are obviously shaped by the state, but
the state in turn is shaped by the family and its
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legal order because each is part of the other
(Fitzpatrick 1984). And although pluralists
historically focused primarily on the state’s rela-
tionship to internal nonstate law within its bor-
ders, the framework is equally cogent in study-
ing external dialectical interactions both with
other states and with various international or
transnational legal communities. Indeed, recent
international law scholarship emphasizes ways
in which states are changed simply by the fact
that they are part of an international network of
states (Goodman& Jinks 2004). Such an insight
echoes pluralism’s coconstitutive approach.
In addition, pluralism offers possibilities for
thinking about spaces of resistance to state law.
Indeed, by recognizing at least the semiauton-
omy of conflicting legal orders, pluralism nec-
essarily examines limits to the ideological power
of state legal pronouncements. Pluralists do not
deny the significance of state law and coercive
power, of course, but they do try to identify
places where state law does not penetrate or
penetrates only partially, and where alternative
forms of ordering persist to provide opportuni-
ties for resistance, contestation, and alternative
vision. Such an approach encourages interna-
tional law scholars to treat the multiple sites of
normative authority in the global legal systemas
a set of inevitable interactions to be managed,
not as a problem to be solved. And again, al-
though pluralists historically studied only non-
state alternatives to state power, the interna-
tional law context adds state-to-state relations
and their overlapping jurisdictional assertions
to the mix, providing yet another set of pos-
sible alternative normative communities to the
web of pluralist interactions.
Finally, pluralism frees scholars from need-
ing an essentialist definition of law. For ex-
ample, with legal pluralism as our analytical
frame, we can get beyond the endless debates
both about whether international law is law at
all and whether it has any real effect. Indeed,
the whole debate about law versus nonlaw is
largely irrelevant in a pluralist context because
the key questions involve the normative com-
mitments of a community and the interactions
among normative orders that give rise to such
commitments, not their formal status. Thus, we
can resist positivist reductionismand set nation-
state lawwithin a broader context.Moreover, an
emphasis on social norms allows us to see more
readily how nonstate legal orders can have sig-
nificant impact on the world. After all, if a state-
ment of norms is ultimately internalized by a
population, that statement will have important
binding force, often even more so than a for-
mal law backed by state sanction. Accordingly,
by taking pluralism seriously we canmore easily
understand how the contest over norms creates
legitimacy over time, and we can put to rest
the idea that norms not associated with nation-
states necessarily lack significance. Indeed, le-
gal pluralists refuse to focus solely on who has
the formal authority to articulate norms or the
coercive power to enforce them. Instead, they
aim to study empirically which statements of
authority tend to be treated as binding in actual
practice and by whom.
Of course, there are differences among
forms of ordering, particularly given that some
legal forms have coercive state power behind
them while others do not. Also, disparities in
political and economic power strongly affect
how much influence any particular normative
community is likely to have. But even those
differences are not completely determinative.
After all, even if formal legal institutions have a
near monopoly on legitimate use of force, there
are many other forms of effective coercion and
inducement wielded by nonstate actors (Weber
1954). In addition, official legal rules that are
contrary to prevailing customary or community
norms often have little or no real-world effect,
at least not without the willingness (or capa-
bility) of coercive bodies to exercise sustained
force to impose such rules. Thus, obedience to
norms frequently reflects sociopolitical reality
more than the status of those norms as law. As a
result, “[d]efining the essence of law or custom
is less valuable than situating these concepts in
particular sets of relations between particular
legal orders, in particular historical contexts”
(Merry 1988, p. 889).
In any event, the important point is that
scholars studying the global legal scene need
www.annualreviews.org • The New Legal Pluralism 237
ANRV392-LS05-11 ARI 24 September 2009 19:10
not rehash long and ultimately fruitless de-
bates (both in philosophy and in anthropol-
ogy) about what constitutes law. They can in-
stead take a nonessentialist position: treating as
law that which people view as law (Tamanaha
2000). This formulation turns the what-is-law
question into a descriptive inquiry concern-
ing which social norms are recognized as au-
thoritative sources of obligation and by whom.
Indeed, the question of what constitutes law is
itself revealed as a terrain of contestation among
multiple actors (Nader 2002).
Interestingly, global legal pluralismhas been
criticized both by committed international law
proponents and by committed nation-state
sovereigntists. For those who have worked for
decades trying to convince governments, policy
makers, and populations to treat international
legal rules as authoritative and hierarchically
binding positive law, a pluralist framework
may seem to undermine their efforts (e.g.,
Koskenniemi 2006). Even those less committed
to international norms and institutions as a
philosophical matter may nevertheless seek
universal harmonization of norms in order to
simplify the seeming chaos of pluralism (e.g.,
Bhagwati 1996, pp. 32–34). Sovereigntists, for
their part, seek to draw clear lines of demar-
cation between spheres of authority and worry,
on both a practical and a philosophical level,
about the influence of norms not adopted by a
governmental unit within a polity [e.g., Posner
& Sunstein 2006, p. 133 (citing articles)].
In response to these concerns, pluralists of-
fer answers that are both descriptive and nor-
mative. As a descriptive matter, pluralists argue
that legal fragmentation and the contest among
plural sources of norms are not realities that a
hierarchically situated actor can choose to per-
mit or reject; pluralism is simply a fact because
multiple communities assert norms that have
impact. Thus, regardless of what international
law proponents say, there will always be re-
sistance to universal norms because there are
multiple communities with different normative
commitments. As a result, although harmoniza-
tion regimes are certainly important and influ-
ential, they will never occupy the entire field.
Likewise, a sovereigntist rejection of foreign,
international, or nonstate influence and author-
ity is unlikely to be fully successful in a world
of global interaction and cross-border activity.
Indeed, seen from the point of view of U.S. his-
torical practice, “sovereigntists have a dismal
track record, in that American law is constantly
being made and remade through exchanges,
some frank and some implicit, with normative
views from abroad. Laws, like people, migrate.
Legal borders, like physical ones, are perme-
able, and seepage is everywhere” (Resnik 2008a,
pp. 63–64). Accordingly, instead of bemoaning
either the fragmentation of law or the messi-
ness of jurisdictional overlaps, we should ac-
cept them as necessary consequences of the fact
that communities can be neither homogenized
into a single universal collective nor hermeti-
cally sealed off from one another.
More normatively, we can go further and
consider the possibility that this jurisdictional
messiness may, in the end, provide impor-
tant systemic benefits by fostering dialogue
amongmultiple constituencies, authorities, lev-
els of government, and nonstate communi-
ties (Berman 2007). In addition, jurisdictional
redundancy allows alternative ports of entry
for strategic actors who might otherwise be
silenced. Thus, following the insights of le-
gal pluralism, we may view normative conflict
among multiple, overlapping legal systems as
not only unavoidable but sometimes even de-
sirable, both as a source of alternative ideas and
as a site for discussion about community def-
inition and creative innovation. Accordingly,
instead of trying to stifle legal conflict either
through a reimposition of territorialist pre-
rogative or through universalist harmonization
schemes, communities might seek (and increas-
ingly are creating) a wide variety of procedu-
ral mechanisms and institutions for managing,
without eliminating, pluralism. Such mecha-
nisms and institutions may help mediate con-
flicts by recognizing that multiple communi-
ties may legitimately wish to assert their norms
over a given act or actor, seeking ways of rec-
onciling competing norms, and deferring to
other approaches if possible. Moreover, when
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deference is impossible (because some instances
of legal pluralism are repressive, violent, and/or
profoundly illiberal), procedures for managing
pluralism can at least require an explanation.
Although it is beyond the scope of this re-
view to engage in a more detailed discussion of
the many such procedural mechanisms and in-
stitutions for managing pluralism currently in
place,5 the crucial antecedent point is that, al-
though people may never reach agreement on
norms, they may at least acquiesce in proce-
dures that take pluralism seriously, rather than
ignoring it through assertions of territorially
based power or dissolving it through universal-
ist imperatives. Processes for managing plural-
ism seek to preserve the spaces of opportunity
for contestation and local variation that legal
pluralists have long documented, and therefore
a focus on pluralism may be both normatively
preferable and more practical precisely because
agreement on substantive norms is so difficult.
CONCLUSION
Although legal pluralism (and pluralist schol-
arship) is clearly not new, only in recent years
has pluralism come to be used as a framework
for conceptualizing the multiple conflicting ju-
risdictional assertions (both state and nonstate)
that characterize the global legal arena. By
studying the many local settings in which the
normsofmultiple communities—geographical,
ethnic, national, and epistemic—become oper-
ative, scholars can gain a far more nuanced un-
derstanding of the international and transna-
tional legal terrain. This is a world in which
claims to coercive power, abstract notions of
legitimacy, and arguments about legal author-
ity are only part of an ongoing conversation,
not the final determining factors. It is a world
in which jurisgenerative practices flower, creat-
ing opportunities for contestation and creative
adaptation.And althoughwemaynot like all the
norms being articulated at any given moment,
it will do no good to ignore them or to insist on
their lack of authority. In a plural world, law is
an ongoing process of articulation, adaptation,
rearticulation, absorption, resistance, deploy-
ment, and on and on. It is a process that never
ends, and international law scholars would do
well to study the multiplicity and engage in the
conversation, rather than impose a top-down
framework that cannot help but distort the as-
tonishing variety of law on the ground.
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